In this paper I compare revocation of citizenship laws in three democratic countriesCanada, Israel and the US. At first glance it appears that in each of the countries there is one common factor that provides the pretext for expatriation -wars. This explanation accords with the existing literature on citizenship. This paper shows that there is a greater principle that all countries share that plays a role in the perception of citizenship and its revocation, both in the past and present. I argue that the extent to which a country desires immigration (and fears emigration) is what explains revocation of citizenship laws. That is, forced expatriation as a policy became more widespread with the institutionalization of the national world order which does not tolerate multiple national allegiances. However, states do start to allow dual citizenship, in contradiction to the national world order, when they fear that it will undermine desired immigration to the country.
The 20th century has brought numerous changes to our society. One of the major transformations was the crystallization of the national world order (and some would say the beginning of its demise). This paper is a comparative analysis of one of the less acknowledged phenomena in the western democratic world -that of stripping away citizenship. It is less known, because there is an assumption that the status of citizenship in democratic countries is secure. The revocation of citizenship is associated with totalitarian or oppressive regimes (Arendt 1973; Dugard 1980 In this paper I compare revocation of citizenship laws in three democratic countries -Canada, Israel and the US. At first glance it appears that in each of the countries there is one common factor that provides the pretext for expatriation -wars.
Grounds for Expatriation
This observation accords with the existing literature on citizenship in the three countries. In the US it was during military conflict that most expatriation bills were legislated; in contrast, Canada was less affected by wars and hence has allowed multiple national loyalties; and in Israel, it is the constant conflict with the Palestinians that has shaped the revocation of citizenship. However, the comparative and historical method has had a crucial effect on the outcome of this investigation.
Only by comparing the three countries can it be shown that there is a greater principle that all countries share that plays a role in the perception of citizenship and its revocation and explains the relations between the particular factors within each context. I argue that the extent to which a country desires immigration (and fears emigration) is what explains revocation of citizenship laws. That is, forced expatriation as a policy became more widespread with the institutionalization of the national world order which does not tolerate multiple national allegiances. However, states do start to allow dual citizenship, in contradiction to the national world order, when they fear that it will undermine immigration to the country.
I will begin by describing the existing (although limited) literature on the revocation of citizenship as a legal procedure. I will show that those legal theories only describe expatriation rather than explain its origin and waning use. I will investigate this procedure in three countries so as to identify the factors that determine taking away citizenship. I show that previous scholarly assessments of citizenship that looked at each case separately provide only partial explanation for this phenomenon. Finally, I provide my own assessment of the sociological source for the genesis, persistence and curtailment of forced expatriation in democracies.
Up till now, the issue of revocation of citizenship has been predominantly dealt with from a legal perspective (Abramson 1984; Aleinikoff 1986; Appleman 1968; Boudin 1960; Cashman 1967; Graham 2004; Griffith 1988; Gross 2003; Matteo 1997; Ronner 2005; Schwartz 1982 ). Most academic articles described and assessed revocation laws or the specific cases where these laws were applied. That is, legal experts investigated the relationship between those rules or court decisions and other legal instruments: bills, acts, constitutional amendments, international treaties or other legislative instruments. In this study I intend to position the revocation of citizenship within a sociological framework. That is to say, I shall not just compare these pieces of legislation with other legal acts, but rather situate the notion of expatriation within its social, political, economic, and historical contexts. Indeed, last year an edited book was published on expatriation (Green and Weil 2007) . However, it deals mainly with expatriates -those who voluntarily leave their countries -rather than with the policy of forced expatriation. There are two main advantages to looking beyond the confines of the terminology of the various laws. First, by not limiting ourselves to the language of legal proceedings, we can locate the meaning originally invested in these laws rather than just their contemporary interpretations. Second, by relating the analysis of the loss of citizenship to existing sociological theory on citizenship, I can review ongoing academic debates on the 'nature' of citizenship itself from a fresh perspective.
The most scrupulous theorization of the notion of loss of citizenship was made by Aleinikoff (1986) . In this paper, he tries to determine whether stripping Rabbi The latter distinction may be only an analytical categorization as we can usually obtain only the justification for governmental actions rather than the authentic motive of the government for its action. These points may provide another underlying explanation for the Kahane case. In the end, Meir Kahane was stripped of his American citizenship as a punishment for his political opinions rather than for intending to terminate his allegiance to the US (which was the grounds for his denationalization). This stance is illuminated even further when we realize that Marcia Freedman who was also an American who was elected to the Israeli parliament (two years prior to Kahane) was exempted from having to relinquish her citizenship. The Kahane case could be seen as a punishment justified by a need to maintain exclusive allegiance. We should be aware that the official justifications may the 20 th century demonstrated the exact opposite, but historical evidence shows that even before that, the US was constantly engaged in war and its culture was constructed accordingly (Anderson and Cayton 2005; Ferguson 2004 ). As the historical survey of expatriation policies in the US shows, it was during (or in relation to) wars that taking away citizenship was initiated. However, it is less clear how military conflict actually determines or shapes that exact formulation of this policy.
In each of the conflicts that produced legislation to revoke citizenship, the construction of the "enemy" was different. In the Civil War the perceived danger - Israeli militarism is evident in the tendency to prefer military solutions to social challenges (Ben-Eliezer 1988) . If the hypothesis that dual allegiance is permitted only in peaceful countries is valid, we would expect to have a harsh expatriation policy in Israel.
According to the ethnic principle of the Israeli state, the Law of Return (1950) explicitly refers only to the right of Jews to reside in Israel. Nonetheless, the Israeli parliament legislated an additional statute to regulate citizenship in Israel. In this law, Indeed, once again it was the armed conflict that shaped the citizenship and its removal. However, in contrast to the US, armed struggles caused the State of Israel to adopt dual citizenship rather than to forbid it.
The same logic appeared again with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This However, militaristic considerations do not always push states to prohibit dual citizenship. In Israel, the need for Jewish immigrants resulted in the adoption of a lenient attitude toward multiple allegiances.
The explanation for the different policy in the US and Canada should not be limited only to military conflict. Instead we should shift our attention to immigration policies. Although immigration is the focus of most scholarly studies of citizenship, I
would like to highlight another aspect of this phenomenon. Most academic work on the relationship between citizenship and immigration deals with the identity of the immigrants. That is, the focus is on the distinction between those who are allowed to enter the state and those who are excluded from membership in the state (For example, see Brubaker 1992; Jacobson 1996; Joppke 1999; Schuck and Smith 1985; Shafir and Peled 2002; Smith 1997; Soysal 1994) . I argue that in addition to the identity of the immigrants, an important factor is the extent to which any immigration is desired. That is, it is not only who is entitled to enter the national community, but also, how many. In the cases discussed, Canada and Israel have an explicit aspiration for more immigration; the United States sees immigration as an individualistic enterprise. Accordingly, Canada and Israel dropped the nationalistic demand for distinct citizenship in favor of more immigrants, while the US officially bans dual allegiance. Citizenship does not only address the type of obligations demanded and rights conferred on individuals within the national territory, but addresses the extent to which those principles should apply.
